Abstract. Different guidelines for implantable pacemaker and cardioverter defibrillator therapy pose problems for legal liability in Canada. Medical practices in the United States provide measures for comparative assessment, but the Canadian health care system is operated and publicly funded on West European principles. Provincial governments accept the responsibility to provide their residents with reasonable access to medically necessary services, including devices, on conditions of partial reimbursement by federal government funds. However, some provinces may fund services for which they will not be reimbursed. Practitioners may practise according to governmental funding arrangements. The law recognizes that practitioners in a respected minority in their specialty can depart from generally approved professional guidelines, by retaining earlier practices that are not discredited, or by adopting newer, but non-mainstream practices. They can similarly follow professional guidelines different from those of their colleagues. Practitioners who depart from guidelines they profess to follow risk legal liability, but compliance does not invariably ensure judicial approval. Judges preserve the right to set standards of professional proficiency, since they are a matter of law, but usually endorse professional guidelines. Patients' choices must be adequately informed, according to well-established criteria of disclosure that must be applied to evolving professional views of best and acceptable practice, which are usually influenced by practice guidelines. Inadequate governmental provision of devices or services to ensure patients' care according to practice guidelines can be challenged in legal proceedings. Success may require governments to improve supplies, but judges may decline to give directions with serious budgetary implications. However, unsuccessful litigants against, for instance, governments or physicians, are liable to be required to pay the successful defendants' legal costs, and usually their own.
Introduction
The evolution of somewhat different guidelines for implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) therapy in the United States and Europe poses a particular problem in Canada. Geographical proximity of the U.S. and easy interchange of medical personnel between the two countries, for consultation, conferences, and more prolonged educational and working exchanges, produces a permeable medical culture, reinforced by an easily accessible common and often shared specialist literature.
U.S. standards therefore often provide the most direct measure of Canadian practice. However, the Canadian health care system, based on provincial governments supplying somewhat different services under federal government uniform minimum standards of eligibility for partial repayment, more closely reflects West European practice of governmental regulation. Further, the senior Canadian medical establishment retains significant European links, at professional and often family levels.
Canadian medical jurisprudence develops in awareness of, but not necessarily in conformity with, experience in the U.S. federal and more influential state courts, but background laws and court procedures are more distinctively European. Criminal law is based on principles of English law, and civil (meaning non-criminal) law has a similar basis, although the French tradition prevails in Quebec [1] . Accordingly, medical malpractice liability arising from development of pacemaker and defibrillator guidelines relates to the guidelines that are considered applicable, and to claims that alternative guidelines should apply.
Legal Approaches to Practice Guidelines
Even when a medical specialist association approves a set of practice guidelines, Canadian courts recognize that there can be a respected body of practitioners whose practice does not conform. Under what is sometimes called the Respected Minority Rule, some practitioners are legally empowered to resist any particular professional guideline. They may adhere to an earlier practice that the profession in Canada at large has progressed beyond, if that practice is not discredited, for instance by evidence of poor outcomes or adverse side-effects. Alternatively, the minority may embrace newer practices that have not been rigorously tested by scientifically valid studies but that show sufficient evidence, perhaps through anecdotal reports, to be promising. The Rule does not accommodate, of course, maverick innovation of untested treatments, or those that are now almost universally abandoned as harmful or ineffective. However, a choice exists among different reputable guidelines even when one set prevails.
Practitioners who are shown to have caused harm to patients by departing from guidelines to which they claim to adhere will almost invariably risk legal liability for negligence. Liability may be for negligence in itself, or for breach of contractual agreements, usually implied, to abide by particular guidelines. Such guidelines may be scrutinized to determine whether they accommodate scope for legitimate variance, or include exceptions or contraindications for compliance, but courts may take a rigid view and consider them not simply to guide but to govern the practice of practitioners who claim to follow them.
In contrast, however, compliance with a professed guideline is not necessarily a legal defence. In the overwhelming majority of cases, compliance is a defence, since courts are strongly inclined to defer to medical professional judgment regarding appropriate and acceptable practice. The Supreme Court of Canada has observed that "It is generally accepted that when a doctor acts in accordance with a recognized and respectable practice of the profession, he or she will not be found to be negligent" [2] . However, at the same time, the Court added that an exception arises when the accepted practice is "fraught with obvious risks" [3] . While emphasizing that nonmedical people, including judges, must necessarily defer to medical expertise, the Court considered that lay opinion could condemn a locally applied practice that carried a clear risk. It observed that "where there are obvious existing alternatives which any reasonable person would utilize in order to avoid a risk, one could conclude that the failure to adopt such measures is negligent notwithstanding that it is the prevailing practice among practitioners in that area" [4] . This may open the way for a jury, or for a judge sitting without a jury, to favour one professional practice guideline over another. The effect and implications of guidelines on the use of cardiac pacemakers and defibrillators will almost invariably be beyond their own knowledge. In cases in which expert witnesses are introduced to address the relative merits of alternative guidelines, however, a factual basis may appear on which guidelines followed by defendant practitioners can be found, in contrast to others, to be clearly deficient.
Patients' Informed Choices
Basic legal doctrine in the U.S., Canada, such European jurisdictions as, for instance, France, Germany and Switzerland, and to some extent the United Kingdom, requires that patients be adequately informed about practices practitioners propose to apply, and be offered a choice among any alternatives [5] . Practitioners need not explain the derivation or authority of the practice they prefer and recommend, nor the refinements of how such guidelines differ from others. They must explain, however, how different interventions or modes of practice may affect their patients' comfort, risks, recovery times and future lifestyle options and constraints. Patients are entitled to their practitioners' conscientious recommendations made in their best interests, and referral to other accessible practitioners for whose style of practice, perhaps following alternative guidelines, patients form a preference.
Among patients' options is the right to forgo care that accords with a practice guideline, and to decline all recommended care. The legal, medical, and, for instance, bioethical literature often addresses "informed consent," but an adequately informed person can legally choose not to consent, and therefore to cease to be, or not to become, a patient, or can decline a physician's recommended care and request an alternative. A physician who considers the patient's request to violate a preferred guideline, or otherwise to endanger the physician's classical ethical duty to do no harm, may offer to transfer the patient's care to another practitioner who will comply with the patient's request, or give notice of a time when, without abandonment, the physician-patient relationship will end.
In exercising the choice to accept treatment that accords with a practice guideline, the patient must agree both to bear any necessary processes, such as implantation of a pacemaker or defibrillator, and to accept the conditions and the limitations of functioning with it in place. This may include periodic attendance for monitoring of personal health and of the device's operation. The information patients receive before implantation will include their right to require later removal of the device, and of the processes and risks to their health that removal will entail. Such information should be given, and repeated on the patient's request for removal, non-defectively, with care not unduly to induce or scare the patient into compliance with the physician's contrary advice.
Disclosures to patients who enquire about pacemaker or defibrillator options include:
• their prognosis if they decline all treatment options; • alternative practices of implantation of devices and their health care implications; • alternative treatments that are appropriate, such as drug therapies, coronary revascularization, catheter ablation and electrosurgical therapy; • success and failure rates of the different available device-based and alternative treatments;
